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Abstract—Location-based Digital Rights Management (DRM)
refers to a system allowing the owner of an electronic file
to specify not only the actions a user is allowed to perform
regarding the content, but also restrict the actions to a specified
geographical area. A method for retrieving location information
is required. One such method is to place wireless accesspoints in
areas of interest, requiring a device to be in the vicinity of the
correct accesspoint(s) in order to access a file.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital rights management (DRM) technology allows the
owners of electronic information to control the use and
distribution of that information. DRM restricts access to an
encrypted file according to a policy set out in a machine-
readable license.
Traditional DRM was used to protect multimedia such as
music, video or artwork. With the increased use of electronic
document storage the need for protection of digital objects
during their lifecycle increases. In the case of corporate Intel-
lectual Property (IP) there is the additional need of restricting
access to limited times and locations. E.g.
- University library, lending material to students
- Club, licensing music for playing in a club area
- Employee accessing IP at office but not at home
In addition, the increased use of wireless connections and
networks bypasses the need for a malicious user to gain phys-
ical access to a terminal or network in order to access content.
The use of portable PDAs and wireless enabled laptops may
enable an attacker to access corporate data from outside a
company’s physical security measures. Location constraints
are meant to address this issue by ensuring that a device is
present on-site, allowing an employee access to content when
at work but not from home or outside the company.
Since most corporate and academic environments already
have a network of WiFi accesspoints in place, and since these
devices rarely move, it might be possible and convenient to
use these to verify the location of a device and enforce the
constraints. In the case of a WiFi location system like this,
the DRM client does not need to know where it is, only
whether or not it is in the vicinity of the WiFi accesspoint(s)
specified in the license, and the DRM provider does not need
to know where the device is at all. This has the added benefit
of providing privacy to the user since only the user’s device
holds the location information.
Abbr. Description
RO Rights Object, license
AP Wireless AccessPoint
BSSID Basic Service Set Identifier, unique AP identifier
DRM Digital Rights Management
Hotspot Area covered by one or more AP(s)
wifi Wireless fidelity, 802.11 type networks
ODRL Open Digital Rights Language
REL Rights Expression Language
dBm dB milliWatts. dBm = log(mW) * 10
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication,
measures received signal strength in a WiFi adapter
TABLE I
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
In this paper we propose a simple addition to the existing
OMA DRM system. By allowing a DRM system to enforce
a location constraint using an already present infrastructure
the system can be used in a wider range of situations. One
such example is within Enterprise DRM (EDRM) where the
prevention of intellectual property leaking outside a company
is crucial.
In Section III we present a short description of the 802.11
wireless structure and how the signalstrength and range of
standard hardware WiFi accesspoints can be used to determine
or verify location. Our implementation is described in Section
IV. We give an overview of the OMA DRM system followed
by a description of how to define a spatial constraint in a
license. Some data from our experiments follows. Attacks on
the system are outlined in Section V and a conclusion follows
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous systems have been proposed for determining or
verifying the location of a mobile device. In the application
considered in the present paper, we require the location of
a mobile device to be verified such that a dishonest user
cannot fake his or her location. Many such systems have been
proposed, based on WiFi networks, GPS, cellular telephone
networks, RFID and other sensor networks. A variety of
commercial systems are available from Newbury Networks [8],
Ericsson [3] and Ekahau [2].
The approach described in this paper differs from most of
the foregoing work in that we do not attempt to determine the
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location of the device, or require a third party to track the lo-
cation of a mobile device. Our approach is most similar to that
of Kindberg, et al. [6] in that we use the presence or absence of
a signal with a known geographical distribution to bound the
location of a device. Their system, however, requires mobile
devices to engage in a challenge-response protocol with a third
party location verifier while our system enables the device to
perform an entirely self-contained location verification.
In this way, location-based access control rules can be
enforced without any implications for the privacy of the user,
and without the need for devices to contain large databases of
reference points from which they can compute their position as
in the Placelab [9] and Herecast [4] systems. While GPS-based
systems such as Mundt’s [7] have similar properties, GPS
signals cannot penetrate buildings and WiFi-based systems are
more effective in this context.
III. BOUNDING LOCATION USING WIFI
A. WiFi
WiFi is short form for “wireless fidelity” and refers to
any type of 802.11 network, whether 802.11b, 802.11a etc.
The term is promulgated by the Wi-Fi Alliance. WiFi was
originally intended for use with mobile devices and LANs, but
is now used extensively for Internet access as well. A region
covered by one or more AP(s) is called a hotspot and allows
a device to access the network(s) serviced by the AP(s).
Each AP has a unique identifier, the BSSID. This identifier
is broadcast by most public APs and allows a client to identify
which APs it is connected to or has access to.
The BSSID of (an) AP(s) can be used by a device to deter-
mine its location. This can be done in at least two ways. One
way is having the device read AP BSSIDs and signalstrengths
of the APs surrounding it and sending the information to a
server capable of interpreting the information and return an
absolute geographical position as in 1(b). Another way is to let
the device read the AP information and determine its location
relative to the APs as in 1(c).
RSSI is an acronym for Received Signal Strength Indication
and is a numerical representation of the strength of the received
signal in a WiFi adapter. RSSI measurements may vary from
0 to 255 depending on the vendor. 0 indicates no signal and
RSSI Max indicates full signal strength. For example, Cisco
Systems cards will return an RSSI of 0 to 101. In this case,
the RSSI Max is 101. RSSI is however an arbitrary numeric
interpretation of the basic signal strength. It is not specified
what dBm should be mapped to what RSSI value, so this is
largely up to the vendors to decide, allowing for variations
between devices of different brands. The RSSI was originally
only meant to be used internally in the device to among other
things decide when a device is clear to send.
As demonstrated in the Placelab and Herecast systems
[4], [9], an absolute location can easily be determined. This
requires the existence of a globally accessible database. It also
requires the device to obtain its location from said server,
diminishing the privacy of the devices using the system. In this
case, the license needs to specify the geographical coordinates
(a) Assuming a location server that can
locate a device independent of action by
device
(b) Using a central server where a device
can lookup its location based on local AP
readings
(c) The device determines whether it is
within specified range of a set of APs
specified in the license
Fig. 1. Different methods with which the location information can be obtained
that limit the area within which the content can be used.
This requires detailed knowledge on the part of the license
creator that needs to know the absolute geographical positions,
BSSIDs, and signalstrengths of every AP to be included in the
license.
In a DRM scheme, a device need not know its real world
location. It needs only know where it is in relation to a
specified set of APs. By specifying a set of APs, using their
BSSIDs, and require a device to identify and be within range
of one or more of them, an area can be defined. A device
that can access the required number of the specified APs can
therefore verify that it is in a specified location and allowed
to access a file. This only requires the license creator to know
the BSSIDs and signalstrengths of the APs to be used. These
can all be easily measured as needed.
B. RSSI value normalization
It is possible to further refine the area in which a file
can be accessed by observing the RSSI value of each AP.
Specifying accepted signal strength range(s) along with the
BSSID(s) can help specifying the accepted area with even
smaller granularity.
Since the RSSI values vary between vendors and even
between different cards by the same vendor in some cases,
it may be necessary to normalise the RSSI values.
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Name MinRSSI (a) MaxRSSI (b)
D-LinkAirPlusDWL-650+ 50 100
D-LinkAirDWL-610 -50 -100
TopComSkyr@cerPCCard3044 50 100
Atheros based cards 0 60
Cisco cards 0 100
TABLE II
DIFFERENT VENDOR CARD’S RSSI RANGES
RSSI values can be normalized into a percentage scale using
Equation 1. The equation consists of the variables RSSI, a,
and b. RSSI is the actual value from the access point, a is
the lowest possible signal strength, and b is the highest signal
strength possible.
normalizedRSSI = abs
(
(RSSI − a) × 100
a − b
)
(1)
Table II shows a few cards and their RSSI value ranges. The
range depends on the manufacturer of the chipset the card is
based on. Cisco cards range between 0 and 100 while Atheros
based cards range between 0 and 60.
Different RSSI values between diffent vendors is not a major
issue in an enterprise environment where this type of system is
likely to be implemented. Within a company or similarly con-
trolled environment, uniform hardware is commonly deployed
and the system can be attuned accordingly.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. OMA DRM
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) is the organization
that specifies mobile service enablers that ensure service
interoperability across devices, geographies, service providers,
operators, and networks. OMA DRM Version 2.0 is a standard
to specify methods of secure delivery of and protection of
multimedia content. The OMA DRM system consists of rights
issuers (RIs) who are responsible for providing rights objects
(ROs), or licenses, that permit access to protected content and
managing authorized domains, and DRM agents that permit
users to to use protected content according to the rights
specified in ROs.
All DRM agents must meet tamper-resistance requirements
specified by OMA, and be certified by the Content Manage-
ment License Administrator (CMLA) before being permitted
to access ROs and protected content. This guarantees that
dishonest users will not be able to extract unprotected content
or decryption keys from devices.
Protected content is distributed in an encrypted format
called the DRM Content Format (DCF). Each DCF file is
encrypted using a random content encryption key (CEK) and
can be freely distributed using any convenient method. The
content encryption key is included in any RO that awards
rights to use the associated content, and the sensitive parts
of the RO (including the CEK) are encrypted using a rights
encryption key (REK). Finally, the rights encryption key for
an RO is encrypted using the public key of the DRM agent for
which the RO is intended. This DRM agent can then access
the content by reversing the chain of encryption.
Typical constraints supported by OMA include count and
time constraints, allowing a user to access a content a certain
number of times or for/during a certain period of time. The
OMA specification does not explicitly define a location or
spatial constraint.
B. Our spatial constraint
We have developed a system using WiFi devices for location
verification, adding location as an additional control parameter
in our extended OMA DRM system. The Placelab API [9]
was used to access WiFi APs and read signalstrengths. This
system can be used with Bluetooth beacons, WiFi APs, or a
combination thereof.
In our DRM system, the extended rights object contains
information specifying the geographical area in which the
content associated with the rights object can be used. In
order to specify a location the rights object needs to contain
information about AP(s) and signalstrength(s). To accomplish
this, a rights object using an extended version of the ODRL
<o-dd:play>
<o-ex:constraint>
<o-dd:count>7</o-dd:count>
</o-ex:constraint>
<o-ex:constraint>
<o-dd:location>
<o-dd:accesspoint>
<o-dd:bssid>
00:0e:38:a3:cf:cb
</o-dd:bssid>
<o-dd:rssi>43,55</o-dd:rssi>
</o-dd:accesspoint>
<o-dd:accesspoint>
<o-dd:bssid>
00:0e:83:5c:cf:cb
</o-dd:bssid>
<o-dd:rssi>26,61</o-dd:rssi>
</o-dd:accesspoint>
</o-dd:location>
</o-ex:constraint>
</o-dd:play>
TABLE III
EXTRACT FROM RIGHTS PART OF RO WITH LOCATION INFORMATION
was created. This rights object specifies the BSSID(s) of one
or more APs located in the area where the content is allowed
to be used. It may also contain an upper and/or lower bound
on the signalstrength for each AP (See table III).
The device can enforce the location constraint by refusing
to use content if the correct APs, as specified in the rights
object, cannot be accessed. The rights object could specify a
number of APs and require the device to be within range of
any them. The rights object could also specify several APs
and require the device to be within range of all or some APs
listed, thus limiting the area. Since the BSSID of the AP(s)
can be read directly by the device, no server lookup is needed.
As can be seen in Figure 2, different levels of granularity
can be achieved depending on the amount of information
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specified in the rights object. More APs and tightly specified
allowed ranges for the signalstrengths to each allows for
finer granularity. As can be seen in Figure 3, an issue with
using APs indoors is that a hotspot extends in a sphere. This
may allow an attacker sitting on a higher or lower floor to
access content meant for a room on this floor. The signal will
however be attenuated when passing through the ceiling of this
floor, making it possible to exclude other floors with carefully
selected signal ranges.
(a) Just checking for connectiv-
ity gives a rough estimate of lo-
cation
(b) Adding lower bound on sig-
nalstrengths improves the granu-
larity of location
(c) Adding range for signal-
strengths improves the granular-
ity even more
Fig. 2. Levels of granularity depending on specified signalstrengths
Fig. 3. The range from each AP is extended as a sphere, allowing for access
from an elevated point
The ranges as described and as shown in Figures 2 and
3 are idealized. In a real environment objects and walls will
interfere with the signals and distort the ideal spherical hotspot
as in Figure 4. This is a problem that affects all technologies
relying on connection between objects, like WiFi, GPS and
GSM.
Fig. 4. The ideal spherical hotspot around an AP can be distorted by walls
and objects like heavy cabinets
Fig. 5. Positions and layout of the testing area
C. Experiments
We performed a series of tests with the aim of determin-
ing whether a limited area could be bounded by measuring
signalstrengths of surrounding WiFi accesspoints. The general
layout of the testing area can be seen in Figure 5 where the
numbered twirls represent accesspoints. The strength of the
signal is given by a number between 0 (no connection) and
100 (perfect connection).
We noted the strengths of a series of readings at different
times in each corner of the room in which accesspoint 1 is
located. Several readings were made to eliminate the chance
of getting a misread due to temporary atmospheric distortions,
moving people and similar disturbances. The average values
of the readings for each corner can be found in Table IV
As can be seen, by requiring that a device can get a signal-
strength above 80 connecting to accesspoint 1, the area where
a device can access a content can be limited to within a certain
distance of that accesspoint. By requiring a signalstrength
between 50 and 75 to the second AP, the area can be further
limited. Combining this with a required signalstrength between
60 and 80 to AP number 3, the bounded area is limited to
within the room.
The areas overshooting the desired area, allowing an at-
tacker to access a content by standing just outside a wall,
e.g. at the top, left and bottom right parts of the room, will
be almost non-existent due to signal attenuation through the
walls (see Figure 4 for an example).
By incorporating a WiFi reader into our implementation we
found that content could not be accessed anywhere outside the
bounded room but could be accessed from anywhere within
the room most of the time. Trying to access content within
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Accesspoint NW NE SE SW
1 89 91 80 83
2 51 61 71 64
3 69 63 78 74
TABLE IV
AVERAGE SIGNALSTRENGTH READINGS FROM TEST LOCATION
the area but standing close to a boundary would occasionally
cause access to be rejected.
V. ATTACKS
This technology used in this way is vulnerable to a number
of attacks due to the fact that WiFi APs are not intended for
the purpose of locating themselves or devices connecting to
them. The purpose of an attack in this context would be either
to trick a device into verifying that it is in a specific location
when it is not, or to prevent a device from verifying that it is
in a location when it actually is.
A. Authentication
One issue is authentication of the AP itself. An AP
broadcasts its BSSID to every device in range, but a rogue
accesspoint with the same BSSID can relatively easily be
created using tools like airsnarf [1]. This would allow an
attacker to make a device believe it is in the vicinity of a
specific AP even though it is not. Unless the AP have the
means of encrypting the broadcasted data with for example
a private-public key-pair, there is little that can be done to
prevent this. An approach would be to have the AP broadcast
its BSSID and a timestamp, all encrypted with a private key. A
device can then verify that the broadcasted BSSID comes from
the real AP and that it has not been tunnelled from another
location using a wormhole attack.
B. Wormhole attacks
Wormhole attacks are attacks where an attacker receives
packets at one point in a network and tunnels these packets
(possibly selectively) to another point. This allows a rogue
AP to pose as a real AP even if a device authenticates an
AP using a protocol. The attacker can simply pose as the real
AP, tunnel the device’s authentication code to the real AP and
tunnel the responses back to the device, making the device
assume it is in an accepted location to access content. These
attacks are difficult to detect and protect against. One proposed
method is to use packet leashes as described by Hu, Perrig
and Johnson [5]. This requires the devices and AP(s) to have
tightly synchronized clocks allowing for detection of large
tunnelling times of packages (temporal leash). Mundt defines
a system that can be used with WLAN mesh networks to
authenticate APs and prevent tunnelling or wormhole attacks
in his paper [7]. In this system each AP is assumed capable of
two-way communication and in possession of a public/private
key-pair. Each AP is also paired with a secure hardware
module with a precise clock. In order to prevent spoofing of
the node, messages are signed using the private keys. The
secure clock is used to measure network latency. A tunnelling
or wormhole attack introduces latency in the signal since all
data must be retransmitted to a remote location. By measuring
this latency and by making multiple measurements and use the
minimum as the correct latency, normal temporary delays due
to busy channels can be distinguished from tunnelling which
introduces a constant delay.
C. Denial of Service attacks
Another easily mounted attack on an AP is a Denial of
Service (DOS) attack. A DOS attack is commonly executed
by flooding a device, in this case an AP with a large amount
of fake messages or requests. A DOS attack will in this case
never result in a successful retrieval of protected content. If
the communication is interrupted by an attacker, the location
will in worst case not be established and the DRM system will
reject the request.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a method that uses location as an additional
decision parameter in a Digital Rights Management system by
using WiFi accesspoints to verify the location of a device. In
order for this method to be used in a real-world system, a few
things are required from the WiFi acesspoints. The existence of
public/private key-pairs and the addition of a precise, tamper-
proof internal clock are needed to ensure that the location
obtained by a device is correct. Using more advanced, later
generation accesspoints with on-board processing capability
will allow for two-way protocols for authentication and times-
tamping.
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